rethinkingsecurity:

An exploration at Information Dissemination.

rethinkingsecurity:

I recognize my last missive, scribbled in a bit of haste, might have seemed a bit opaque. I was in a bout of intense frustration and simply wanted to get something out before I returned to analyzing the intricacies of the G.O.O.D. Music vs. YCMB beef, (big hint: I’m rooting for Pusha-T—any…

rethinkingsecurity:

Don’t even bother reading Elizabeth Bumiller’s article on the counterinsurgency debate. It’s stuck in the same bizarre post-Surge time loop all mainstream articles on COIN are.

Instead, let’s go through some basic pointers. My own views on this have evolved significantly over the years due to…

As is wont to happen, the current forms of warfare the United States in engaging in and preparing for lend themselves easily to misrepresentation and simplification. As the U.S. appears to wind down the era of large scale U.S.-led land operations, particularly ones in which the U.S. is bearing the brunt of combat against insurgencies, the new form of U.S. operations against non-state actors has unsurprisingly been described in terms such as drone wars or components of an offshore or counterterrorism strategy, while conventional platforms and capabilities are viewed in reference to the apparent “pivot to Asia” and AirSea Battle. However, recent events in Yemen demonstrate that such these sorts of small war operations, while they have a significant covert component and often involve the use of remotely piloted aircraft, also involve boots on the ground and the use of what are often conceived of as conventional military platforms such as naval and aerial ISR and strike assets.

I do, however, take exception to a number of the points raised. It seems that a theme central to the arguments presented is that Army is using progression of the amphibious capability as a means of restoring itself as ‘Australia’s primary strategic instrument’, posturing itself to undertake the leading role in a major war, or simply (forlornly) attempting to ‘retain relevance’.

These perspectives are unfounded and unhelpful. Army’s modernisation decisions are not driven by a quest for primacy within the ADF. By virtue of a decade of experience of combat operations, the current generation of Army’s soldiers and officers understands the fundamental requirement for ‘jointery’. This is more than a bumper sticker; it is an immutable consideration fundamental to the conduct of modern military operations, particularly with a defence force as small as ours.

Observing the lethality and effectiveness of modern distributed special operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere gives one an appreciation for the potential benefits these types of ISR-leveraged, economy of force operations may someday bring to the maritime realm. Over a series of posts, I’ve attempted to articulate this operational concept. Here are some thoughts on decentralized warfare in the littorals.  Next, a discussion on one of the ways these operations could be employed in an irregular warfare setting. And here, some ideas on how distributed firepower could enable small ships to become a force multiplier in big wars. Finally, a post arguing that adequate bandwidth at sea is critical to tie all of these concepts together. 

2012 JWC Luncheon Keynote: Gen James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.) (by USNavalInstitute)

This article combines many of my favorite things: US interests, an underdog, outsmarting bad guys, Roman history, and Clausewitz.